[Capítulo III: Entendiendo la República Ineficiente] 3 causas historicas sobre el fracaso del desarrollo argentino
[http://tqe.quaker.org/wealth-and-poverty/18soamer.htm]
Extracto del libro "History of Wealth and Poverty" sobre las fallas de Argentina en mantener un desarrollo económico durable.
Untitled1
Three Historic Properties
The failure of durable economic development in Argentina stems from three historic properties:
• Power for its own sake—not just for the economic advantage it brings—is demanded by competing sectors of the elite. Not trusting the political parties, many in the military believe that stability and peace depend on themselves as fallback. These leaders deem themselves defenders of the fundaments, not just purveyors of policy.
• Regardless of statements affirming democracy, every group in power has both favored and sustained an interventionist state. This has been true under military and civilian governments, both conservative and radical, including Peronist. All sectors of society endorse this precept, and all solutions or modus vivendi are designed accordingly. A politically or economically liberal course is beyond the horizon.
• Confrontation characterizes the political process. In a study of ruling groups, Imaz concluded that there is no longer an "elite" in Argentina, for those who govern include persons of all classes, from descendants of immigrant laborers to the traditional landowning aristocracy. But because of differing backgrounds, these groups do not trust each other, they communicate imperfectly, and they make impossible demands upon one another. Under such circumstances, a minor incident may be exaggerated into a serious crime. For example, in 1983 the president of the Central Bank was indicted for treason because he had negotiated an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.
Yet all three historic properties must be qualified. Occasionally one hears proposals for decentralization and liberalization. Sometimes there are political compromises. After an unsuccessful military coup against him in 1987, President Raúl Alfonsín visited the rebel barracks to negotiate a peaceful settlement.48 America's Watch interpreted the limited prosecutions of the military for "dirty war" crimes to be a compromise preserving the peace49—a sentiment disputed by many. Despite these exceptions, the balance lies with the confrontational ethic in Argentine political behavior. Government inefficiency, corruption, wage and price control, and improvident monetary and fiscal policies are the legacy of these historic properties.
While mainstream economists, foreign governments, and international agencies agree that these maladies are the basic problems, their error is threefold. First, they call inefficiency, corruption, and poor policies "structural" when a still more fundamental structure—the three historic properties—underlies them. Second, they call for their resolution by fiat or "structural adjustment," to be undertaken by the same authorities who gave rise to the problems in the first place. Third, by finding a "way out" of financial problems, outside agencies relieve the home government of the necessity to compromise. The International Monetary Fund becomes the scapegoat for unpopular policies not reached by internal agreement. But a scapegoat does not last forever, and when it is gone the problems it allowed to be evaded return in greater force.
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Posted by Alberdi & Urquiza to Capítulo III: Entendiendo la República Ineficiente at 1/20/2006 07:42:26 AM
Extracto del libro "History of Wealth and Poverty" sobre las fallas de Argentina en mantener un desarrollo económico durable.
Untitled1
Three Historic Properties
The failure of durable economic development in Argentina stems from three historic properties:
• Power for its own sake—not just for the economic advantage it brings—is demanded by competing sectors of the elite. Not trusting the political parties, many in the military believe that stability and peace depend on themselves as fallback. These leaders deem themselves defenders of the fundaments, not just purveyors of policy.
• Regardless of statements affirming democracy, every group in power has both favored and sustained an interventionist state. This has been true under military and civilian governments, both conservative and radical, including Peronist. All sectors of society endorse this precept, and all solutions or modus vivendi are designed accordingly. A politically or economically liberal course is beyond the horizon.
• Confrontation characterizes the political process. In a study of ruling groups, Imaz concluded that there is no longer an "elite" in Argentina, for those who govern include persons of all classes, from descendants of immigrant laborers to the traditional landowning aristocracy. But because of differing backgrounds, these groups do not trust each other, they communicate imperfectly, and they make impossible demands upon one another. Under such circumstances, a minor incident may be exaggerated into a serious crime. For example, in 1983 the president of the Central Bank was indicted for treason because he had negotiated an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.
Yet all three historic properties must be qualified. Occasionally one hears proposals for decentralization and liberalization. Sometimes there are political compromises. After an unsuccessful military coup against him in 1987, President Raúl Alfonsín visited the rebel barracks to negotiate a peaceful settlement.48 America's Watch interpreted the limited prosecutions of the military for "dirty war" crimes to be a compromise preserving the peace49—a sentiment disputed by many. Despite these exceptions, the balance lies with the confrontational ethic in Argentine political behavior. Government inefficiency, corruption, wage and price control, and improvident monetary and fiscal policies are the legacy of these historic properties.
While mainstream economists, foreign governments, and international agencies agree that these maladies are the basic problems, their error is threefold. First, they call inefficiency, corruption, and poor policies "structural" when a still more fundamental structure—the three historic properties—underlies them. Second, they call for their resolution by fiat or "structural adjustment," to be undertaken by the same authorities who gave rise to the problems in the first place. Third, by finding a "way out" of financial problems, outside agencies relieve the home government of the necessity to compromise. The International Monetary Fund becomes the scapegoat for unpopular policies not reached by internal agreement. But a scapegoat does not last forever, and when it is gone the problems it allowed to be evaded return in greater force.
--
Posted by Alberdi & Urquiza to Capítulo III: Entendiendo la República Ineficiente at 1/20/2006 07:42:26 AM
posted by Pablo Presas at 10:43 a.m.
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